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The Extent of State Ownership of Submerged Lands
in California
nArnone*
By William

During 1970, the California Attorney General in conjunction with
the California State Lands Commission initiated action to overturn 100
years of case law and statutory enactments governing title to submerged lands in California. Statutory construction generally had held
that California's ownership of these lands extended only to the lowwater mark. The Attorney General, however, asserted that state ownership of the lands beneath California nontidal navigable waters extended to the high-water mark.' The state made this claim despite
section 830 of the California Civil Code, which states that the owner of
land bordering on a navigable lake or stream takes to the "edge of the
lake or stream, at low-water mark .... -2 Currently, the state asserts
that section 830 is applicable only in construing conveyances between
private parties.
The potential impact of the state's claim is readily apparent in
view of the many California landholdings which are bounded by navigable lakes and streams. This change in position, making the waterward extent of title unclear, has created uncertainty and confusion
among the landholders potentially affected. The result has been a
number of civil actions filed by landowners seeking judicial clarification of the extent of their landholdings. 3 Several of these are now being
heard at the appellate level.4 Until this issue is resolved conclusively,
the property rights of all littoral and riparian- landowners in California
* J.D., 1979, Hastings College of the Law; A.B., 1976, University of California at
Davis.
I. California v. Shasta Pipe & Supply Co., No. 37390 (Cal. Super. Ct., Butte County
Mar. 25, 1971).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1954).
3. See Letter from Evelle J. Younger, California Attorney General, to William F.
Northrop, Executive Officer, State Lands Commission (Mar. 8, 1977) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal)[hereinafter cited as Letter from Evelle J. Younger].
4. See, e.g., Lyon v. State, No. 13925 (Cal. Super. Ct., Lake County Nov. 19, 1976).
5. "Riparian" is defined as "[b]elonging or relating to the bank of a river, of or on the
The term is sometimes used as relating to the shore of the sea or other tidal
bank....
water, or of a lake or other considerable body of water not having the character of a watercourse. But this is not accurate. The proper word to be employed in such connections is
'littoral.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1490 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
[329]
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will remain in doubt.
To understand fully the significance of the state's new claim, the
claim must be examined in light of the historical development of land
ownership rights in California. Therefore, the first part of this Note
examines the effect upon land ownership of California's admission to
the Union and the state's subsequent adoption of the English common
law. This overview points out the original source of California's title to
submerged lands and provides a basis for comparing the new claim
with established state law.
The second part of this Note focuses on the high-water mark versus low-water mark dispute by examining both federal and state law in
this area, with an emphasis on the development of California law. This
examination is necessary because some judicial decisions confuse the
appropriate federal rules with the appropriate state rules. 6 California
case law and statutory enactments both supporting and abrogating the
use of a low-water mark dividing line then are examined in depth and
compared to the policies of other states.
Finally, the new claims being made by the Attorney General are
analyzed, leading to the ultimate conclusion that the new position
taken by the state as to the extent of its title is unsound and that the
policy of state ownership to the low-water mark is so embedded in both
case and statutory law that a mere change in administrative policy cannot diminish the existing rights of riparian and littoral landowners.
Sources of California Title to Submerged Lands
Following eighty years under the reign of Spain and Mexico, and
two years as a United States territory, the State of California was admitted into the Union on September 9, 1850, by an act of Congress
which established, in part, that "the State of California shall be...
admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States in
all respects whatever."'7 Prior to California's admission, when Mexican
policies controlled, ownership of the land beneath both navigable and
innavigable waters was in the sovereign.8 Upon admission into the
Union, however, the "equal footing" clause resulted in the adoption of
the land ownership policies of the thirteen original states. Those states
9
maintained absolute ownership of the land beneath navigable waters.
0
The ownership of the beds of innavigable waters was private.' Therefore, one of the major effects of California's admission on an equal
6. See note 52 & accompanying text infra.
7. An Act for the Admission of the State of California into the Union, 9 Stat. 452
(1850).
8.
9.
10.

Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
Wright v. Seymour, 69 Cal. 122, 125, 10 P. 323, 324-25 (1886).
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footing was the resulting mass grant of ownership of the land beneath
innavigable waters to riparians owning land bordering on or including
such waters.
The full impact of California's admission on an equal footing and
the consequent differentiation between navigable and innavigable waters was not clarified until April 13, 1850, when the first California legislature adopted the common law of England as the rule of decision for
the state." The English common law developed a rule of navigability

which was suitable to the topography of Great Britain, a country with
few major inland waterways. The rule stated that only waters affected
by the ebb and flow of the tides were navigable.' 2 While this rule may
have been suitable in Great Britain, it was inadequate in the United

States, with its many major freshwater inland waterways.13 Despite the
disparity between the British topography and that of the United States,

the federal government used the same test of navigability as England
until 1851.14 In that year, however, the Supreme Court, recognizing the

topographical differences between the two nations, discarded the English test in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh15 and adopted instead a navigable-in-fact test. This test has been modified further by
the Supreme Court' 6 but still states essentially that if a waterway is
navigable-in-fact then it is navigable-in-law.' 7 Because the common
law of England, as adopted by the states of the Union, generally is
interpreted to include the decisions of American courts up to the time
11. "The Common Law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with
the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of the State of California,
shall be the rule of decision in all Courts of this State." Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 95, at 219.
12. There has been considerable disagreement regarding the derivations and subtleties
of this rule. One of the more succinct discussions of the rule is found in an unpublished
paper by Lee Jordan, who divided the English rule into three parts: "1) in a navigable river,
that is one subject to tidal influence, the public has a navigational servitude, but the state
owns the bed of the river, 2) in a public river, one in which there is no tidal influence but
which is navigable in fact, the riparian who takes a grant from the sovereign owns the bed,
and the public has a navigational servitude; 3) in a private river, one which is non-navigable
and non-tidal, there is no navigational servitude, and the riparian holds title to the bed." L.
Jordan, Tests of Navigability: The Potomac River Experience (1973) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
13. Outlining the evolution of federal and state tests of navigability is beyond the scope
of this Note. For a detailed discussion, see Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and
PrivateRights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 391 (1970).
14. See, e.g., The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
15. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851).
16. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
17. Not until the 1920s, however, did federal law clearly take precedence over state law
for the purpose of determining which navigable waterway beds a state gained title to upon
attaining statehood. See Johnson & Austin, RecreationalRights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. REsOURCES J. 1 (1967).
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of adoption, 18 it was this American test, as opposed to the English rule,
which California took by adopting English common law. 19 Thus, immediately following California's admission to the United States, the
state held title in its sovereign capacity to all of the soil beneath navigable-in-fact waters, excepting of course those parcels which had been
granted explicitly to riparian or littoral owners pursuant to federal patents or Spanish and Mexican land grants. In contrast, state ownership
of lands bounded by or including innavigable waters extended to the
thread of the stream or the center of the pond.
High-Water Mark v. Low-Water Mark
An analysis of the central issue of this Note, whether state lands
extend to the high-water mark or only to the low-water mark, requires
an examination of both federal and state law. This examination should
help to clear up much of the confusion in this area which has arisen
from a failure to keep applicable federal and state rules separate.
An examination of relevant federal law generates two distinct issues. First is the degree of restraint exercised by the federal government in asserting property rights in its own transactions involving
water-bounded properties within a state. Second is the extent of control possessed by each state with regard to land transactions in waterbounded properties within that state. The current controversy in Cali20
fornia arises in part from a failure to keep these issues separate.
The limits which the federal government sets on its own transactions are clear. When the United States grants land bordering on navigable waters or cedes property to states achieving sovereign status, the
conveyance of title to the land does not extend waterward of the highwater mark. 2 1 Thus, based on this approach and the equal footing doctrine, lands in California bordering on nontidal navigable water are
free from any federal claim waterward of the high-water mark.
The law governing the second issue, the extent of state power over
submerged lands recognized in the United States, is clear as well.
States may retain title to land below the high-water mark of inland
navigable waters or may grant to riparian and littoral owners title to
the submerged lands down to the low-water mark or even to the thread
18. See generally McKnight, Title to Lands in the CoastalZone: Their Complexities and
Impact on Real Estate Transactions, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 408 (1972) (discussing California's

adoption of the common law).
19.

Id

20.

See note 52 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of the California courts'

failure to keep these issues separate.
21. See Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1891); 50 WASH. L. REV. 777, 779-80
(1975). See also Federal Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301(a)(1), 1311(a)(1)
(1976); 78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters § 386 (1975).
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22
of the stream as governed by state law.

In response to this choice many states have chosen to relinquish

their submerged lands to private ownership.2 3 Although the original
states, adopting the English common law, claimed sovereign title only
to the lands underlying waters which were affected by the ebb and flow
of the tides,2 4 various states have extended their claims to all of the

land beneath inland waters which were navigable-in-fact. In so doing,
most states limited their claims to the low-water mark.25 Significantly,
not until 1856, six years after California's admission to the26Union, did
any state claim sovereign title up to the high-water mark.

27
Some states, however, do claim title up to the high-water mark.
The result is an inconsistent pattern of state policies concerning the

extent of ownership of submerged lands. Rather than formulating a
uniform national rule, the federal government avoids conflict with this
hodgepodge of state policies by asserting no rights of its own below the
high-water mark and observing state rules governing the rights of ripa-

rian and littoral owners.

California Law
The three California statutes which bear most directly upon the
extent of riparian or littoral title are sections 670 and 830 of the Civil
Code and section 2077 of the Code of Civil Procedure.2 8 Civil Code
section 670 is the general statute which recognizes state ownership of

22. See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1890). See also R. SKELTON, THE LEGAL
ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARIES AND ADJACENT PROPERTIES 321 (1930).
23. See H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 258 n.4 (1904) (citing
cases indicating states using low-water mark); R. SKELTON, THE LEGAL ELEMENTS OF

BOUNDARIES AND ADJACENT PROPERTIES 321 nn.1 & 4 (1930) (discussing low-water mark
and thread of stream). See also J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES
39 (1877).
24. The Royal Fishery of the Banne, [1610] Davies Rep. 140, 149.
25. See, e.g., West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 167-68 (1863); Canal
Comm'rs v. People, 5 Wend. 423, 466-67 (N.Y. 1830); Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Pa. 185, 201
(1847); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binney 475, 478 (Pa. 1810).
The widespread state policy of limiting sovereign ownership of these lands to the lowwater mark has found approval in the United States Supreme Court. In Massachusetts v.
New York, 271 U.S. 65 (1926), the Court rejected the common law practice of recognizing
sovereign ownership of tidelands up to the high-water mark to inland submerged lands because "[t]he lack of clear definition, by natural land marks, of the shore of non-tidal waters,
would make [application of a high-water mark boundary] impracticable. . . ." Id at 93.
26. See, e.g., McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1 (1856).
27. See, e.g., St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890);
Peck v. Alfred Olsen Const. Co., 238 N.W. 416 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1931); Hume v. Rogue River
Packing Co., 51 Or. 237, 92 P. 1065 (1907); C. Beck Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 139 Wis. 340,
120 N.W. 293 (1909).
28. These sections were first enacted in 1872, Cal. Stat. 1872, ch. 424, and later
amended in 1874 to their present form. Cal. Stat. 1874, ch. 612, § 99, at 217 (amending
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submerged lands. 29 Civil Code section 830 and Code of Civil Procedure section 2077 deal more specifically with the use of the high-water
mark versus the low-water mark. Civil Code section 830 provides, in
part, that "the owner of the upland,. . . when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, where there is no tide,. . . takes to the edge of the
lake or stream, at low-water mark .... -30 Code of Civil Procedure
section 2077 states rules for construing a conveyance of real property,
and provides: "When a navigable lake, where there is no tide, is the
boundary, the rights of the grantor to low-water are included in the
conveyance.",31
These sections well expressed the intent of the legislature. At the
time of its enactment in 1872, section 830 accurately and plainly reflected the common practice in the several states. 32 Moreover, the California Supreme Court approved the "common practice" interpretation
in the case of Wright v. Seymour, 33 in which the court stated that "the
doctrine of sections 830 and 670 of our Civil Code is believed to be but
a declaration of the law on this'34subject as it has existed since the formation of our state government."
Low-Water Mark Cases
The clarity of section 830, not surprisingly, has led to a number of
California cases ruling that the low-water mark constitutes the limit of
state ownership. Although the statute is seldom discussed at length,
several cases indicate its controlling effect.
City of Los Angeles v. Aitken 35 presents a concise statement of section 830 as California law. Los Angeles, in an attempt to supply the
water needs of its residents, diverted the water flowing into Mono Lake,
a navigable body of water. The court held that the amount of money
offered to the littoral owners in the resulting eminent domain proceeding was insufficient because the diversion destroyed the aesthetic quali§ 670); § 111, at 220 (amending § 830); Cal. Stat. 1874, ch. 383, § 244, at 390 (amending
§ 2077).
29. "The State is the owner . . . of all land below the water of a navigable lake or
stream.
...CAL. CIv. CODE § 670 (West 1954).
30. CAL. CIv. CODE § 830 (West 1954).
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2077 (West 1955).
32. Not until 1856 did a state assert sovereign title to the high-water mark. See note 25
& accompanying text supra. This rule did not receive the approval of the United States
Supreme Court until 1876, in the case of Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876). The Court
there was careful to recognize that only "the law of that State," and not any prevailing
national rule, established the boundary at the high-water mark. Id at 336. See 43 Op. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 291 (1964), for a similar interpretation of Barney.
33. 69 Cal. 122, 10 P. 323 (1886).
34. Id at 127, 10 P. at 326. Accord, Drake v. Russian River Land Co., 10 Cal. App.
654, 660, 103 P. 167, 170 (1909).

35.

10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935).
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ty of the area upon which a resort business had been built.36 In
describing the ownership rights of the parties involved, the court, citing
section 830, noted that "the title of the respondents 37to their respective
tracts of land . . . extends to the low-water mark.
This statement by the court of appeal in Aitken is paralleled by
several opinions of the California Supreme Court. For example, in

Craigv. White 38 the supreme court dealt with a tract of land bordering

upon the shores of Clear Lake. The court relied on section 830 for its

holding:
Prior to the issuance of state patents to the defendant, United States
patents had been duly issued to settlers on the government uplands
bordering on this part of the lake, which patents, under the established rule governing such transfers, conveyed title to the patentees,
to the actual margin of the lake. . . .39

Any ambiguities regarding the meaning of the phrase "margin of the
lake" can be resolved by noting the court's citation of section 830, indicating the low-water mark as the "margin" referred to by the court.
The California case of Anderson v. Trotter40 provides further sup-

port41

for the vitality of section 830 as controlling law in California.

Anderson dealt with the waterward extent of federal patent lands bordering Clear Lake. The court held that the patents granted title down

mark, directly citing section 830 as the controlling
to the low-water
42
state statute.

In summary, there is considerable case support for the proposition
that section 830 correctly states California law. The courts largely have
agreed that sovereign title to the lands beneath nontidal navigable waters extends only to the low-water mark. This rule has become firmly
established in California. 43 In addition, the analyses of the cases in this

area by the State Attorney General's Office, until 1970, were consistent
in recognizing the low-water mark as the boundary. 44

Despite this expressed statutory and judicial policy, several Cal36. Id at 474-75, 52 P.2d at 592.
37. Id at 467, 52 P.2d at 588.
38. 187 Cal. 489, 202 P. 648 (1921).
39. Id at 491-92, 202 P. at 649.
40. 213 Cal. 414, 2 P.2d 373 (1931).
41. In the case of Foss v. Johnstone, 158 Cal. 119, 110 P. 294 (1910), the supreme court
approved in dicta the authority of Civil Code § 830 as a correct statement of the law governing certain incidents attaching to tile to land bordering upon waters. 158 Cal. at 127, 110
P. at 298.
42. 213 Cal. at 420, 2 P.2d at 375.
43. See 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 1855-56 (8th ed. 1973); 2 CAL.
JUR. 3d Adjoining Landowners § 63 (1973).
44. See, e.g., 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 291, 291-92, 295, 296 (1964); 30 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. 262, 269 (1957); 23 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 306, 307, 309 (1954); 23 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
97, 98 (1954); Op. Cal. Att'y Gen., No. 3100, at 5-6 (1916).
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fornia cases appear inconsistent in considering the actual extent of state
title. In examining these cases, however, it becomes apparent that they
do not correctly represent California law.
High-Water Mark Cases
In Churchill Co. v. Kingsbury,4 5 the California Supreme Court
stated in dictum that the boundary line of state ownership is the highwater mark. Upon close examination, however, this case does not provide a sufficient foundation for such a claim.
The land involved in Kingsbury bordered on the Little Klamath
Lake, a nontidal, navigable body of water. The petitioner sought a writ
of mandamus to compel the issuance of a state patent to the lands between the high-water mark and the low-water mark of the lake.4 6 The
petitioner relied upon the terms of an act of 1893 which provided for
the sale of lands uncovered by the recession or drainage of the waters
of inland lakes and lands which were deemed unsegregated swamp and
overflowed lands.4 7 The writ was denied on the ground that the land
did not fall within the purview of the act. The court reasoned that the
land was not uncovered by the receding waters of a lake; rather it was
48
subject to the periodic seasonal fluctuations of the lake level.
The portion of the opinion which bears on the high-water mark
versus low-water mark dispute involves a statement made by the court
which was not relevant .to the actual disposition of the case. Whether
the lands were held pursuant to the state's sovereign status or pursuant
to the swamp and overflowed lands act was not at issue. The controlling issue was whether the land qualified for sale under the act. In this
dictum, then, the court merely was acquiescing in the petitioner's stipulation to the land's status:
Since the act [allowing the sale of land uncovered by receding lakes]
authorizes the sale both of sovereign lands and of unsegregated
swamp and overflowed lands, it might not be necessary for the petitioner to maintain that the lands in question fall within one of these
classes rather than the other. It does, however, take the stand that
the land is, in fact,
sovereign land of the state, and in this, we think, it
49
is clearly right.
The court supported this position with a citation to Barney v. Keokuk,5 0 in which the United States Supreme Court approved Iowa's
claim to land beneath a nontidal, navigable river up to the high-water
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

178 Cal. 554, 174 P. 329 (1918).
Id at 555-56, 174 P. at 330.
Id at 557, 174 P. at 330.
Id at 558-60, 174 P. at 330-31.
Id at 558, 174 P. at 330.
94 U.S. 324 (1876). See note 32 supra.
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5

mark. '
Several factors, however, call into question the validity of the dictum in Kingsbury. Significantly, none of the briefs submitted to the
court in Kingsbury mentioned Civil Code section 830. There is no indication that the court was aware of this statute when the opinion was
written. In addition, the court's reliance upon Barney indicates its misinformation on this issue. Although the Supreme Court in that case
recognized the right of a state to claim sovereign title up to the highwater mark, the court was equally clear in recognizing that state law
controlled the matter.5 2 While Iowa had chosen a high-water boundary, California, by way of section 830, chose a low-water boundary,
and the court should have recognized California's existing policy.
Further, the vitality of the decision in Kingsbury is undermined
seriously by three subsequent cases involving the same properties as
those54 in Kingsbury. In Reynolds v. ChurchillCo.,53 Franklinv. Churchill
Co. (Franklin1), and Franklin v. Churchill Co. 55 (Franklin I1), the
courts decided that the stipulation in Kingsbury56 was incorrect and
that the lands in question were not sovereign lands by virtue of statehood, but by virtue of being swamp and overflowed lands.
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recognized the lack of support in California case law for a claim by the
state to the high-water mark on a nontidal, navigable stream in United
States v. Gossett.57 The court concluded succinctly that "California
had a choice and adopted the low-water mark. Cases implying a differ. . . or tidal waters.
ent policy either involve gratuitous statements
'58
mark.
low-water
the
to
owns
California
Three other cases may imply a state boundary other than the lowwater mark: People v. Morrill,59 Heckman v. Swett, 60 and Packer v.
Bird.6 ' An analysis of these cases, however, shows that they too pro51. 178 Cal. at 558, 174 P. at 330-31.
52. See note 32 supra.. In an earlier analysis, the Attorney General noted the Kingsbury
court's misplaced reliance upon Barney. 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 291, 295 (1964). Subsequently, in a letter to the Executive Officer of the State Lands Commission, the Attorney
General claimed that upon reanalysis of the Kingsbury decision he had determined that the
earlier opinion was wrong. Letter from Evelle J. Younger, supra note 3. No explanation for
this turnabout was given other than the bald assertion that the Kingsbury court's decision
regarding the extent of sovereign ownership was vital, and not merely dicta.
53. 187 Cal. 543, 202 P. 865 (1921).
54. 187 Cal. 555, 202 P. 869 (1921).
55. 73 Cal. App. 304, 238 P. 822 (1925).
56. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
57. 416 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969).
58. Id at 569.
59. 99 Cal. 303, 33 P. 1099 (1893).
60. 26 Cal. 336 (1864).
61. 71 Cal. 134, 11 P. 873 (1886), aft'd, 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
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vide little support for fixing the boundary at the high-water mark.
Rather, as discussed below, Morrill misconstrues the law in dicta,
Heckman involves land beneath tidal waters, and Packer actually supports the controlling effect of Civil Code section 830.
In People v. Morrill,62 the supreme court again was hearing a case
in which the issue of the extent of sovereign ownership of the land beneath nontidal navigable waters was irrelevant. The case involved a
dispute over the ownership of certain tidelands on the Pacific Ocean
which contained substantial asphaltum deposits. 63 The court recognized that a discussion of the law regarding inland shorelines was not
germane to the controversy at bar when it stated that "[t]he lands included in the patent have in fact no relation to any bay or lake or navigable stream .... 1,64 The court nonetheless proceeded to discuss the
title rights of inland riparian and littoral owners, stating in dicta that
their rights "extend down to the line of ordinary high water, and the
lands claimed by the State by right of sovereignty extend up to the
same line. ... "65
This dicta is unsupported in the opinion by either statutory or case
authority and is not emphasized by the court, probably as a result of its
extraneous nature. This statement by the court, rather than providing a
sound basis for a state claim to the high-water mark, is a simple misstatement of the law on a matter extraneous to the facts of the case.
Heckman v. Swett 6 6 dealt with a navigable stretch of the Eel River
at a point which was affected by the ebb and flow of the tides. Plaintiff
claimed exclusive fishing rights to the shore of an island formed as a
result of a flood. 67 The crucial issue was ownership of the newly
formed island. Based on the laws regarding alluvion, 68 the supreme
court held that the island belonged to the state.
The court's statement regarding California law on state title to
submerged land was peripheral to the central question of title to the
island. The court, citing section 830 in providing a background for its
decision, stated: "A conveyance by the state of lands bounding upon
the sea, or upon a bay or navigable stream, would extend to high-water
62.
63.

26 Cal. 336 (1864).
Id at 352-53. The court held for the plaintiff because the defendant's claim to the

land was based on an invalid state patent issued as a result of a misdesignation of the property as swamp and overflowed land.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id at 356.
Id
99 Cal. 303, 33 P. 1099 (1893).
Id at 307, 33 P. at I101.

68. "Alluvion" is defined as "[tihat increase of the earth on a shore or bank of a stream
or the sea, by the force of the water, as by a current or by waves, which is so gradual that no
one can judge how much is added at each moment of time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 102
(4th ed. rev. 1968).
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",69

For the purposes of the present analysis, the most important fact in
this case is that the river at the point in question was affected by the
tides. Thus, as dictated by section 830, "the owner of the upland, when
it borders on tidewater, takes to the ordinary high-water mark."70 In
this light, the statements of the supreme court regarding the high-water
mark as relevant to the issues decided are consistent with California
statutory law. The inclusion by the court of the law regarding navigable streams with the law regarding sea-bound and bay-bound properties may be somewhat misleading. Given the facts in Heckman, and
the court's citation of Civil Code section 830, however, the court's holding should be limited to only those navigable streams which are affected by the ebb and flow of the tides.
Packer v. Bird,7 1 the first supreme court case to discuss the extent
of sovereign title to the lands beneath nontidal, navigable waters, arguably implies a state boundary other than the low-water mark. Close
analysis shows, however, that the court actually supports California
statutory law as expressed in Civil Code section 830.
In Packer,the appellant, who owned land bordering on the Sacramento River, was claiming title to an island in the river at a navigable
point above the ebb and flow of the tides. Appellant's claim rested
upon the assertion that under the English common law the owner of
land bounding on a nontidal river held title to the middle of the watercourse. 72 Respondent countered with the assertion that the law of California was embodied in Civil Code sections 670 and 830 and hence
appellant's title neither extended to the center of the river nor included
73
the island at issue.
The supreme court rejected the appellant's claim, supporting respondent's argument by holding that "[t]he river being navigable in
fact, the title extends no farther than the edge of the stream."'74 Because the controversy dealt only with title to the island there was no
need for an express finding that the boundary at the edge of the stream
was the low-water mark. In view of the court's endorsement of respondent's argument which cited section 830 as controlling, however, the
court's holding properly may be interpreted to mean the edge of the
75
stream at the low-water mark.
69. 99 Cal. at 307-08, 33 P. at 1101 (1893) (quoting People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336
(1864)). See note 63 & accompanying text supra.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1954).
71. 71 Cal. 134, 11 P. 873 (1886), aft'd, 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
72. Appellant's Points and Authorities at 41.
73. Respondent's Points and Authorities at 41.
74. 71 Cal. at 135, 11 P. at 874.
75. Packerwas appealed to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. Packer v. Bird, 137
U.S. 661 (1891). The Court recognized that state law controlled the incidents of title to land
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The most recently decided case to imply a high-water mark
boundary is California v. Shasta Pipe and Supply Co. 76 In this 1970
superior court case, the state first advanced its claim to the high-water
mark. The controversy in Shasta Ppe arose from a series of condemnation proceedings along the Feather River, a navigable river which is
unaffected by the tides. With respect to the disputed portion of the
river, the superior court ruled that the high-water mark constituted the
landward extent of state title. In so doing, the court expressly ruled
that Civil Code section 830 was not the law in California. This judgment was not appealed.
This opinion by a superior court is not controlling. 77 Aside from
the fact that the decision goes against the clear weight of the law, 78 the
grounds upon which this decision is based are unreliable. The invalidation of Civil Code section 830 was based upon a "persuasive footnote" in a general encyclopedia which stated that American law
79
generally extends the states' sovereign title to the high-water mark.
The court stated:
In my opinion the footnote is more persuasive than the opinion in 43
It follows that Civil Code
Attorney General's Opinions 291 ....
section 830 was a departure from the common law and did not divest
the state of its title to the beds of all navigable rivers to the highwater mark .... 80
Contrary to this court's holding, there was no basis in the common law
for a state claim to the high-water mark at the time of California's enactment of section 830.81 Yet, on the basis of this dubious authority,
the court disregarded the established statutory law of California. Unless and until one of the appellate courts currently hearing this issue
bounding upon navigable waters, id at 669-70, and held: "In this case we accept the view of
the Supreme Court of California in its opinion as expressing the law of that State, 'that the
Sacramento River being navigable in fact, the title of the plaintiff extends no farther than the
edge of the stream.'" Id. at 669.
76. No. 37390 (Cal. Super. Ct., Butte County Mar. 25, 1971). This case was a retrial
held in accordance with the instructions of the court of appeal in Department of Pub. Works
v. Shasta Pipe & Supply Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 520, 70 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1968). The court of
appeal sent the case back to the superior court for a determination of the original location of
the bed of the Feather River in a disputed area where the boundaries had been altered. No
reference was made by the court of appeal to the issue of high-water mark versus low-water
mark.
77. Ferguson v. Koch, 204 Cal. 342, 268 P. 342 (1928). See also 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Courts
§ 151 (1973).
78. See notes 25, 35, 38, 40-43 & accompanying text supra.
79. 4 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW Boundries 827 n.2 (2d ed.
1897).
80. California v. Shasta Pipe & Supply Co., No. 37390 (Cal. Super. Ct., Butte County
Mar. 25, 1971).
81. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
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affirms or approves the Shasta Ppe decision, this case should not be
read as an accurate reflection of California law.
Thus, even an examination of the cases which appear most supportive of a claim that the dividing line is the high-water mark8 2 reveals
that sound foundation for such a claim is lacking. The cases are at best
inconclusive in their holdings and reasoning. In fact, the Packer case
may be interpreted as supporting the law in California as expressed in

Civil Code section

830.83

Current State Assertions
The best source for an examination of the state's new title claims is
found in the March 8, 1977, letter from the State Attorney General to
the Executive Officer of the State Lands Commission. s4 To date, this
letter provides the most complete explanation of the legal foundations
for the claims now being asserted. The Attorney General's Office has
refused to issue an official opinion in this matter until an authoritative
decision has been handed down by a court.8 5 Additional information
from the initial pleadings filed in cases curmay be gleaned, however,
6
rently being litigated.
The Attorney General's letter responded to a request by the State
Lands Commission for a written discussion of the legal foundation for
the claims being made in the current litigation. The Attorney General's first assertion was that state ownership of the land beneath navigable lakes and nontidal, navigable rivers extends landward to the
ordinary high-water mark. 7 In addition, the Attorney General advanced state claims to both a "common law public trust for commerce"
and a recreational easement for use of the area between the high-water
mark and the low-water mark. 8
While this Note is concerned only with the first claim advanced, it
is worth recognizing that the state's interests are broader than simply
the question of title. The state may be using an oft-employed technique: asking for more than it thinks it can get to get at least what it
wants.
The letter proceeds to support the claim to the high-water mark by
first discussing what was purportedly the status of state title upon the
admission of California to the Union:
[U]nder the common law as applied in the United States, the initial
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See notes 45-75 & accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
Letter from Evelle J. Younger, supra note 3.
Id at 2.
See, e.g., Lyon v. State, No. 13925 (Cal. Super. Ct., Lake County Nov. 19, 1976).
Letter from Evelle J. Younger, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
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landward extent of the sovereign states' title to the beds of inland
navigable waters is the ordinary high-water mark. .

.

.As of 1850,

the ordinary high-water mark delimited the boundary between the
State of California's sovereign lands underlying inland navigable waters and the adjoining federal public domain lands. . .

Absent a

"declaration" by a state, federal public land grants of such uplands to
private parties do not extend waterward of the ordinary high-water
mark.

....89

The Attorney General next proceeds to set out the crux of the
state's position. He argues that "[while it is clear that] Civil Code section 670 sets forth rules of property and Code of Civil Procedure section 2077 contains rules of construction of ambiguous descriptions in
property conveyances,.

. . Civil Code section 830.

.

.-arguably might

be deemed to enunciate either a rule of property or a rule of construction." 90
The letter goes on to assert that section 830 is a rule of construction
governing only conveyances between private parties. The underlying
premise is that section 830 "did not constitute either a present or future
general conveyance to the federal government or to private parties of
the strip of sovereign lands beneath inland navigable waters between
the ordinary high-water and ordinary low-water marks." 9'
An analysis of the above assertions must focus on two issues, the
power of the state to dispose of the lands below high-water mark according to state law and the reliability of section 830 as an expression
of California law. By opening his argument with the unsupported assertion that the common law of the United States holds the landward
extent of sovereign title to submerged lands to be the ordinary highwater mark, the Attorney General tends to mislead the reader. If the
term "common law of the United States" refers to state law, the Attorney General is in error. At the very least, state policies regarding the
extent of state ownership are sufficiently disparate to prevent any generalizations as to the common law. 92 In93fact, the low-water mark is the
dividing line most commonly adopted.
Assuming that reference was being made to federal policies in this
area, the assertion still is misleading. While federal law recognizes the
right of the states to claim sovereign title up to the high-water mark, the
actual extent of a state's ownership is established by state law. 94 The
89.

Id. at 5.

90.

Id. at 6.

91.

Id. at 7.

92.

See note 23 & accompanying text supra.

93. "[Alccording to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundaries of owners of land
...12 AM. JUR. 2d
abutting upon the navigable lakes extend. . . to the low-water mark.
Boundaries § 15 (1964).
94. See note 22 supra.
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rule regarding sovereign ownership was given by the Supreme Court in
Packer95: "As an incident of such ownership [i e., that deriving from a
federal land grant] the right of the riparian owner, where the waters are
above the influence of the tide, will be limited according to the law of
the state, either to low or high-water mark ....,"96
The Attorney General makes only one reference to the important
principle that state law controls the extent of sovereign ownership of
submerged lands. In recognizing that "laibsent a 'declaration' by a
state" federal land grants extend to the high-water mark of bordering
navigable lakes and streams, 97 the state implicitly acknowledges the
fact that state law controls. The Attorney General, however, never explains in the letter why section 830 does not constitute such a "declaration." He merely asserts as a premise that section 830 could not
constitute a general conveyance to riparian and littoral owners.
Civil Code section 830 accurately reflected the prevailing law at
the time of its passage. Thus, the foundation underlying the Attorney
General's assumption that section 830 could not be construed as a general conveyance of land 98 is false. The Attorney General assumed that
California had clear title to the land between the high-water mark and
the low-water mark which could in turn be conveyed. This, however,
was not the case. Not until 1876, after the decision in Barney, did it
become clear that a state could even claim title to these lands. Therefore, when section 830 was passed, California had no clearly recognized
title to the lands which it could convey by way of statute.
The extent of a state's title is not established until the state speaks
on the subject. In California, the state spoke in Civil Code section 830
and established the low-water mark as the landward extent of state
ownership.
Throughout the current controversy, the state has maintained that
section 830 states a rule of construction rather than a rule of property
law.99 In light of the cases discussed above, the assertion is difficult to
understand. The court's statement in Aitken, 10 0 for example, strongly
indicates that Civil Code section 830 states a rule of property law. In
addition, the position of section 830 among the general statutory rules
of property argues against the state's contention. On the other hand,
section 2077 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the legislative attempt to
make ambiguous conveyances clear through a rule of construction.
There is no logical reason for the legislature to enact two separate rules
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
Id at 669-70.
Letter from Evelle J. Younger, supra note 3, at 5.
See note 91 & accompanying text supra.
See note 91 & accompanying text supra.
See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
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of construction dealing with the same subject matter. Rather, section
2077 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the rule of construction which
derives from California's property law as set out in section 830 of the
Civil Code. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that the two
sections were enacted concurrently.10 '
The state's citation of case authority to support its contention that
section 830 gives a rule of construction also is somewhat misleading.
Section 830, by dealing with the boundaries of riparian and littoral
owners, is often cited in cases in which it is necessary to construe the
0 2
meaning of an instrument of title to such water-bounded properties.'
This fact does not mean that the statute is any less a rule of property in
California. The state nonetheless cites four cases in support of its contention that Civil Code section 830 is a rule of construction. These
cases provide little support for the Attorney General's position.
Freeman v. Bellegarde0 3 is of little assistance to the state because
the supreme court specifically declined to rule on the effect of section
830 in a portion of the opinion dealing with transactions prior to the
10 4
Drake v. Russian River Land Co.105
enactment of California's codes.
involved the construction of a deed to land bounding on a nonnavigable stream. In that case, the court merely cited section 830 as the law
06
which indicated that such ownership goes to the center of the stream.'
1
0
8
The court's sole
Lynch v. Kupfer'0 7 involved a dispute over alluvion.
"[u]nder the
that
comment
its
reference to Civil Code section 830 was
is
nothing to
there
830,
where
authorities and under Civil Code section
title
tract
carries
original
of
the
indicate a contrary intent, a conveyance
10 9 Finally, in Hess v. Merrell,110 title was
to adjoining alluvion."'
claimed by defendants to the center of a nonnavigable stream which
was near their property but was not on the immediate boundary."'
because section 830 applies only to lands
The court rejected the claim 112
waterway.
a
upon
bordering
Even this brief review of the cases cited by the state indicates the
weakness of its position. While some cases which involve the construction of title instruments do cite section 830, this hardly indicates that
101.

See note 28 supra.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See text accompanying notes 103-12 infra.
108 Cal. 179, 41 P. 289 (1895).
Id at 185, 41 P. at 290.
10 Cal. App. 654, 103 P. 167 (1909).
Id at 659-61, 103 P. at 169-70.
134 Cal. App. 652, 26 P.2d 33 (1933).
See note 68 supra.
134 Cal. App. at 656, 26 P.2d at 35.
78 Cal. App. 2d 896, 178 P.2d 467 (1947).
Id at 897, 178 P.2d at 467-68.
Id at 900, 178 P.2d at 469.
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the statute is not a rule of property. In view of the strong language
used by the courts in other cases citing Civil Code section 830 as a rule
of property law, the state's position is untenable.
Conclusion
After examining the extent of state ownership of submerged lands,
understanding the motivation of the state in advancing its claim to the
high-water mark becomes difficult. Both historically and legally the
foundation required for such a claim is lacking. A possible explanation
may lie in the state's claims as a whole being broader than a mere claim
to title. The state also is seeking a declaration of the existence of an
easement to use the waters between the high-water mark and the lowwater mark."13 This Note does not purport to make any judgment as to
the validity of this claimed easement. By advancing claims to both title
and an easement, however, the state may be anticipating that as a result
the courts will be more likely to grant the desired easement. An alternative explanation for the new claims may lie in the fact that the state
may be able to charge substantial rents for existing piers and other intrusions onto the land between the high-water and the low-water
marks. In any case, the claim to title should fail.
The effect of the state's action upon the landowners involved is
dramatic. Throughout the state the title of all riparian and littoral
owners is clouded significantly. These ownership interests have been
thought secure for more than a century. Therefore, judicial removal of
this artificially created cloud upon title is imperative.

113. See note 87 & accompanying text supra.

